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Hijacked or Hooked? 
Religion in Populist Politics in Germany 
 
 
The anonymous authors of Christianity in the AfD, a provocative pamphlet printed by a 
Christian publishing house, aim to analyze and assess the theological themes running through 
the political program of the populist party “Alternative for Germany (Alternative für 
Deutschland)”—“with,” as their advertisement announces, “surprising insights for some.”1 
Turning page after page, the reader discovers that almost all of the pages are blank. There are 
no theological themes in the program, so the authors had nothing to analyze or assess. 
Complaining that the cover of Christianity in the AfD makes it look like a party publication, 
the AfD considered taking the authors to court. But with or without a court case, the plot had 
worked: the populists’ claim to Christianity had been exposed as empty.  
Populist politics is increasingly interpreted as a hijacking of religion.2 Although the 
populists continue to claim Christianity for their political purposes, so the interpretation goes, 
“true” Christianity is opposed to populism as much as populism is opposed to “true” 
Christianity. While I agree with this interpretation, I have a hunch that it might let both the 
populists and their critics off the theological hook. I propose that a theology that dismisses the 
populist claim to Christianity without discussion runs the risk of confirming rather than 
criticizing the patterns of populist politics. Hence, I put forward a response to the rise of 
populism in Germany that calls for conversations about the identity of Christianity. What is 
needed is a theology that retrieves the identity of Christianity in open and open-ended 
conversations to which both Christians and non-Christians can contribute. These conversations 
are a hook that can return the populists and their critics to theology—with, hopefully, surprising 
insights for some. 
 
The Hijackers 
                                                        
1 See Christliches in der AfD (Würzburg: Echter, 2018). Throughout this chapter, translations from primary and 
secondary literature in German are my own unless stated otherwise. 
2 For a survey, including a number of striking case studies, see the convincing compilation by Nadia Marzouki, 
Duncan McDonnell and Olivier Roy (eds), Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion (London: Hurst, 
2016). 
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Populism is a contested concept, but it needs to be defined and described in order to discuss it. 
In his seminal study, What Is Populism?, political theorist Jan-Werner Müller surveys the surge 
of populist politics today.3 He argues that populists pretend to speak for the people—
“populism” is derived from the Latin populus, “people”—by pitting “the people” against “the 
elites” and “the elites” against “the people.” But while the populist appeal to the people appears 
democratic, it actually attacks democracy. As Müller argues: “Populists claim that they, and 
they alone, represent the people.”4 When politics is reduced to issues of identity, however, it 
inhibits democratic deliberation and discussion about different and diverse political positions: 
if you don’t belong to “the people” your political positions are illegitimate and if you do belong 
to “the people” your political positions are legitimate. But in democracies, politics is about 
deliberation and discussion. Müller points to the patterns of populism. Whether you defend or 
despise humanitarian immigration policies—of course, populists almost always argue against 
them—is not enough to decide whether you are or aren’t a populist. How you argue for your 
position is pertinent: populists dismiss opposing political positions by declaring themselves the 
one and only voice of the people.5 In Germany, these patterns of populism can be detected both 
outside and inside the parliaments. 
Once PEGIDA stepped into the public square and onto the political scene, neither 
analysts nor activists could circumvent populism anymore. The letters PEGIDA stand for 
Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, suggesting that the protesters 
identify themselves as patriots struggling against what they see as the “Islamization” of Europe. 
What started as small and scattered protests in Dresden, the capital city of Saxony, Germany, 
soon had spin-offs across the country.6 During their protests—PEGIDA calls them “strolls 
(Spaziergänge)”—the slogan “We are the people (Wir sind das Volk)” is displayed like a shield: 
the people are mobilized and march against the non-people.7 Since the culmination of their 
protests when more than ten thousand picketers strolled through Dresden, the protests are 
                                                        
3 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). 
4 Ibid., 3. 
5 Ibid., 101-103. See also Jan-Werner Müller, “‘Das wahre Volk’ gegen alle Anderen: Rechtspopulismus als 
Identitätspolitik,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Zeitschrift der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 69/9-11 
(2019), 18-24. 
6 For a short survey, including statistics, see Hans Vorländer, Maik Herold and Steven Schäller, PEGIDA 
(Wiesbaden Springer VS, 2016). 
7 PEGIDA appropriates symbols and slogans from the Peaceful Revolution of 1989/90 that brought down the 
“socialist” security state. See my “‘We Can Do This!’ Tackling the Political Theology of Populism,” in Ulrich 
Schmiedel and Graeme Smith (eds), Religion in the European Refugee Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018), 205-224.  
Ulrich Schmiedel (School of Divinity, University of Edinburgh) 
 3 
getting smaller and smaller.8 The populist protests have moved on, from the outside to the 
inside of parliaments across Germany. As Lutz Bachmann, the founder of PEGIDA, announced 
in a speech he delivered during one of the strolls: PEGIDA welcomes and works with the AfD.9  
The AfD was set up as a party-political platform for those skeptical of the European 
Union, but the central concern shifted more and more towards issues of identity. After a number 
of leadership changes (including one in which Bernd Lucke, the party’s founding father, left 
because of the extreme positions taken by the party leadership10), Germany’s identity is now 
at the core of the political program. The program seems successful. The AfD is represented in 
parliaments throughout Germany, including the Bundestag, the federal parliament in the capital 
city Berlin. Polls see its influence increasing rather than decreasing. Like PEGIDA, the 
“Program for Germany (Programm für Deutschland)” that the AfD published recently pits the 
people against the non-people in order to criticize the elites, claiming that the AfD is the one 
and only party that defends “the sovereignty of the people (Volkssouveränität)” against internal 
and external attacks.11 The AfD’s program is the perfect paradigm for the patterns of populism. 
Both inside and outside of the parliaments, then, the patterns of populism are prevalent 
in contemporary German politics. In populist politics, the people’s identity is interpreted in a 
way that allows the populists to draw a strict and stable distinction between the people and the 
non-people. In turn, the distinction enables and equips the populists to delegitimize political 
opposition and public opinion that differs. But who are “the people”? Who are “the non-





Populists inside and outside of the parliaments claim ownership of Christianity for their 
political ends. PEGIDA protesters carry candles and crosses to characterize their protests as 
                                                        
8 There has been considerable controversy about the number of protesters. See the statistics available at 
https://durchgezaehlt.org/ (accessed 29 April 2019). 
9 The speech he delivered during a stroll on 8 January 2018, after the movement had lost many members, shows 
the unabated political and parliamentary ambitions of PEGIDA in spite of these losses. Bachmann runs a channel 
on youtube.com which makes clips of the protests, including the speeches, available (accessed 29 April 2019). 
10 This leadership change was only the first one. The ones that followed moved the AfD further and further to the 
right. For Lucke, the party is now “rechtsextrem,” right-wing extremist. See the “Brandbrief” he published in 
2019, available at  http://bernd-lucke.de/brandbrief-afd/ (accessed 29 April 2019). 
11 See AfD, Programm für Deutschland: Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland (Berlin: AfD, 2017), 7. 
The program is available at www.afd.de/wahlprogramm (accessed 29 April 2019). 
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Christian.12 Snapshots of one cross—large, lit up, and painted in the colors of the German 
flag—has been shared online and offline as a symbol for PEGIDA’s claim to Christianity. The 
“A” in PEGIDA stands for “Abendland.” The term is tricky to translate, but the contrast 
between “Abendland” and “Morgenland”, “land of the evening” and “land of the morning,” 
captures the concept of a clash between “occident” and “orient.” Crucially, this contrast is 
conceptualized through religion. “Abendland” is identified with what is Christian and 
“Morgenland” is identified with what is non-Christian.13 So for PEGIDA, there are Christian 
people suppressed by politicians, on the one hand, and non-Christian non-people supported by 
politicians, on the other. “I feel impaired in the practice of my religion,” Bachmann insists in 
one of his speeches.14 PEGIDA’s Christianity is not defined by what it is but by what it is not—
namely, Islam. Citing statements by clergy, Bachmann, claims:15 “They come in order to 
occupy Europe. If Europe was incorporated into Dar al-Islam, we would have to let go of liberty 
and equality. […] In the Sharia, we can read that the whole world should be subjugated to Dar 
al-Islam. […] Muslims have to learn it by heart. […] They have to do what has been written 
down.” He continues: “Whoever knows Islam understands well why the church should fear it. 
[…] It is beyond doubt that Islam wants to rule the world. Once the Muslims are the majority—
regardless in which country of the earth—they have the religious duty to rule this country.” 
For Bachmann, all Muslims have the duty to kill “the kafir, the unbeliever, who is: you.” 
Religion is the identity marker that decides whether you are or aren’t part of the people. For 
populists, this decision is never neutral: non-people following indecent un-Christian values 
don’t belong to Germany, while people following decent Christian values do belong to 
Germany. 
In the AfD’s “Program for Germany,” religion fulfils a strikingly similar function. 
Christianity is identified and interpreted as a core component of past and present German 
culture. The program refers to “Leitkultur,” the “leading culture” that has to permeate the whole 
                                                        
12 For a detailed discussion of PEGIDA’s claims to Christianity, see again my “‘We Can Do This!’ Tackling the 
Political Theology of Populism,” 205-224.  
13 For a succinct summary of the history of “Abendland” and “Morgenland” in German theology, see Reiner 
Anselm, “Abendland oder Europa? Anmerkungen aus evangelisch-theologischer Perspektive,” Zeitschrift für 
Evangelische Ethik 57/4 (2013), 272-281 
14 Bachmann in a speech delivered during a stroll on 1 December 2014. 
15 Bachmann in a speech delivered during a stroll on 1 August 2016. I am not reproducing the names of the clergy 
Bachmann claims to cite, because I was unable to verify the two citations. However, the fact that anti-Islamic 
attitudes have allowed for an alliance of xenophobes inside and outside the churches is no secret. See Sonja 
Angelika Strube, “Problemanzeige: Rechtsextreme Tendenzen in sich christlich verstehenden Medien,” in 
Rechtsextremismus als Herausforderung für die Theologie, ed. Sonja Angelika Strube (Freiburg: Herder, 2015), 
18-35.   
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country.16 Such a Leitkultur is a weapon in the clash of cultures, the “Kulturkampf” between 
the non-Christian and the Christian, Morgenland and Abendland.17 Islam—interpreted as a 
“doctrine of salvation (Heilslehre)”18—comes up negatively rather than positively throughout 
the program, and much more often than Christianity. Islam is in conflict with the democratic 
order of Germany.19 It is a “carrier of cultural traditions… that cannot be integrated” into the 
country.20 It is waging a “war of culture (Kulturkrieg).”21 Only their political practice and their 
political program, the AfD insists, adequately address the “confrontation by Islam.”22 Religion 
is inextricably interwoven with the patterns of populism. 
For the populists inside and outside of the German parliaments, Christianity is about 
“belonging” rather than “believing.”23 It is not about faith in God. However, given that the 
Europe to which the populists would like to belong is based on nostalgia, a crooked 
construction cobbled together from bits and bops of the history of Christianity, populism is 
also about believing in belonging. Populists belong and believe in a Europe in which the values 
of dignity and decency, seen as started and sustained by Christian culture, contrast with the 
values of indignity and indecency, seen as started and sustained by non-Christian culture. The 
contrast is strict, strong and stable. The significance of Islam in European history is ignored. 
There would be no Christian Abendland without Islam and no Islamic Morgenland without 
Christianity, given how much Christianity has learnt from Islam and how much Islam has learnt 
from Christianity throughout history. However, in populist politics religion is reduced to 
identity: in the case of Christianity, the identity is positive, thus characterizing “the people”; in 
the case of non-Christianity, the identity is negative, thus characterizing “the non-people.” 
In her comprehensive comparative study The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe, 
historian Rita Chin clarifies how such a reduction of religion leads to the construction of the 
essentialist and essentializing difference between Europeans and non-Europeans which she 
describes as “new racism.”24 Comparing the use of religion in a variety of European countries, 
she points to debates about migration in the German parliament of the 1980s. Alfred Dregger, 
                                                        
16 AfD, Programm für Deutschland, 47. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. It is unclear what is meant by “Heilslehre” here. Theologically, it would be interesting to know whether 
Christianity is also a “Heilslehre” for the AfD. 
19 Ibid., 34. 
20 Ibid., 47. 
21 Ibid., 34. 
22 Ibid., 9. 
23 See Olivier Roy, “Beyond Populism: The Conservative Right, the Courts and the Churches and the Concept of 
a Christian Europe,” in Saving the People, 193. 
24 See Rita Chin, The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2017), 140. 
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then chairman of the conservative cooperation of Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and 
Christian Social Union (CSU), addressed the parliament in a debate about migration, naming 
Islam as the issue at stake: “The Turkish people were not shaped by Christianity, rather by 
Islam—another high culture, and I stress, high culture. [...] Even in its more secular form, the 
cultural impulses of Christian and Islamic high culture have a lasting effect on our peoples. 
This contributes, in addition to a pronounced national pride of the Turks, to the fact that they 
are not assimilable. They want to remain what they are, namely Turks. And we should respect 
this.”25  
According to Chin, Dregger’s speech, regardless of whether it was or wasn’t populist, 
“marked the very first moment that religion was used to define an entire national group within 
European political discourse. The fact that this shift first occurred in Germany is not especially 
surprising: Turks were the largest group of ‘foreigners’ in the Federal Republic.”26 Chin 
concludes that the strategies of new racism “carefully avoided the [...] biologically inflected 
notions of race […]. As political weapons, however, they served a similar set of functions, 
routinely characterizing entire groups of immigrants as unfit for […] integration because of the 
intractability of their cultures.”27 The reference to religion continues the reference to race 
without taking recourse to blood and biology. The imprint of culture cannot be escaped. It is 
not people that “have” their religion, but religions that “have” their people.28 
Religion, then, is not only integral to the patterns of populism in German politics. It is 
also dubious and dangerous because it allows populists to draw a distinction between people 
and non-people in a way that perceives and produces “the people” as a category that is not 





Christians across Germany have denounced populism as “un-Christian (unchristlich),” both in 
the pews and in the pulpits. Again and again, churches have argued against populist political 
agendas. But the populists hold their position against it. In their “Declaration of Principle 
                                                        
25 Alfred Dregger, cited in ibid., 159. 
26 Ibid., 160. 
27 Ibid., 139-140. 
28 See also Wendy Brown, “Subjects of Tolerance: Why We Are Civilized and They Are the Barbarians,” in Hent 
de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular Age (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 298-317. 
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(Grundsatzerklärung)”, the “Christians in the AfD (Christen in der AfD)” assert that the 
confession of the Christian faith is central to their political and public work.29 The “Declaration 
of Principle” indicates a number of issues that are intended to identify them as Christian, such 
as integration policies, family policies, and policies on Israel. These policies are framed in an 
account of the significance of Christian culture for Europe past and present. The publication 
Confessions of Christians in the AfD collects personal accounts of AfD participants and 
politicians.30 The populists turn the tables. Churches are criticized for their denial or disavowal 
of Christianity. They are “Amtskirchen,” hierarchical institutions that have lost touch with 
individuals—which is to say, the people. As Bachmann puts it in one of his speeches during a 
PEGIDA stroll, pertaining to the story of Judas in the Bible: in contrast to the “fat princes of 
the church who […] have sold their faith […] for […] a few pieces of silver,” the populists are 
the ones who protect Christianity.31 Who, then, is Christian? Have the churches hijacked 
Christianity from the populists or have the populists hijacked Christianity from the churches?  
When populists argue that they—and only they—represent Christianity, they pit 
Christians against church leaders and church leaders against Christians.  
The critique of elites is central to populist politics. However, reversing the populist 
claim to Christianity by pitting Christianity against populists and populists against Christianity 
runs the risk of confirming rather than confronting the patterns of populism: “this” is Christian 
while “that” is non-Christian, and—by definition—“this” and “that” cannot come together 
because these definitions draw a strict distinction between insiders and outsiders, the identity 
of Christianity and the alterity of Christianity. The idea is: let’s get rid of the populists, they 
are false or fake Christians, their theology has nothing to do with “true” Christianity. In such a 
theological response, Christians would criticize the populists’ essence of Christianity but 
confirm the populists’ essentialization of Christianity. Of course, Christians can respond to 
populist politics by calling the populist claims to Christianity out for their crude and 
contentious concept(s) of Christianity.32 But how can a response to populism avoid the trap of 
entering into the populist patterns itself? The identity of Christianity needs to be radically re-
thought. Christianity is neither static nor stable.  
 
                                                        
29 The “Declaration of Principle” is available at https://www.chrafd.de/index.php/grundsatzerklaerung (accessed 
29 April 2019). 
30 Joachim Kuhs (ed), Bekenntnisse von Christen in der Alternative für Deutschland (Graz: Oxalis, 2018). The 
publication contains the “Grundsatzerklärung.” It also includes the Apostolic Creed in the appendix. 
31 Bachmann in a speech delivered during a stroll on 1 August 2016. 
32 However, such a critique requires self-critique. Some of the statements churches in Germany have published 
about Islam come close to the patterns of populist politics. 
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From Hijacked to Hooked: Rethinking the Identity of Christianity  
 
Whether consciously or unconsciously, both Archbishop Reinhard Marx, representing German 
Catholicism, and Bishop Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, representing German Protestantism, 
offered a re-thinking of the identity of Christianity in response to the so-called cross campaign 
in Bavaria.33 When Bavaria’s Head of State, Markus Söder, announced a decree, whereby the 
symbol of the cross ought to be displayed in the entrances of all offices of the state “as a visible 
confession to the fundamental values of the legal and social order of Bavaria,”34 he tapped into 
the patterns of populist politics. By declaring and decreeing Christianity to be the cultural core 
of Bavaria’s identity, the Christian was marshaled against the non-Christian, shutting Islam 
out. Populism can be found in the political mainstream as well as the political margins. 
Although they criticized Söder’s understanding of Christianity, the church leaders did not 
respond by simply and solely declaring the cross campaign “un-Christian,” but struck a balance 
between theologies of believing and theologies of belonging. According to Marx, the state’s 
attempt to conquer the cross was at the core of the controversy. “The state cannot define the 
sign of the cross.”35 The symbol is defined neither by the state (against the church) nor by the 
church (against the state) but depends on the “witness of Christians,” their beliefs and their 
behaviors.36 Against Söder’s interpretation of the cross as a sign of culture, the Archbishop 
insisted that the content of the central symbol of Christianity cannot be defined or re-defined 
at will. Since “one cannot have the cross without the man who was hung on it,” the cross is 
always already more than culture.37 “Hanging up a cross means: I want to orient my life towards 
the one who died for the world at the cross.”38 In accordance with the Archbishop, Bedford-
Strohm maintained that the state cannot make clear what the cross should or should not signify. 
Christianity speaks for the cross as much as the cross speaks for Christianity. He insisted that 
“the cross cannot be reduced to a sign for the successful provision of a home (Heimat).”39 
                                                        
33 For a detailed discussion of the so-called cross campaign, see my “‘Take Up Your Cross’: Public Theology 
between Populism and Pluralism in the Post-Migrant Context,” International Journal of Public Theology 13/2 
(2019), 140-162. 
34 See the minutes of the meeting in which the cabinet decided on the decree, “Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung 
vom 24. April 2018,” available at http://bayern.de/bericht-aus-der-kabinettssitzung-vom-24-april-2018 (accessed 
29 April 2019). 
35 See “Kardinal Marx zum Kreuz-Erlass: ‘Das Kreuz lässt sich nicht von oben verordnen,’” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
30 April 2018. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, “Identitätsdebatte in der Kirche: Den Sinn des Kreuzes öffentlich machen,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 May 2018. 
39 Ibid. 
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Instead, it is “at least as much the sign of a thought-provoking challenge of all the values of the 
world.”40 Both Archbishop and Bishop, then, pointed to the provocative potential of the cross 
as a symbol. Yet since the provocation of the cross has to be communicated under pluralized 
and pluralizing conditions, it requires a conversation about the cultures of the country to which 
both Christians and non-Christians ought to be allowed to contribute. The plurality of religious 
and non-religious worldviews has to find its place in the public square. 
What is remarkable about the response is that it is not pitting “this” Christianity against 
“that” Christianity, but rather it returns to theology. The identity of Christianity is retrieved as 
a theological project rather than a theological possession. Christianity is interpreted as a 
practice. In the practical project of Christianity, belonging is not simply illegitimate and 
believing is not simply legitimate. Identity, then, can be retrieved, but in order to escape the 
anti-pluralist populist pattern, it needs to be retrieved pluralistically: in a way that opens 
identity up to the other.  
Here, the church leaders’ response to populist politics inside and outside of the 
parliaments could be pushed even further. What keeps Christians from calling for both crosses 
and crescents in the public square? Imagine the discussions that crosses and crescents in the 
entrances of public offices could provoke.41 People with different views about the Christian 
and the non-Christian could be enticed and encouraged to talk to each other. One must not be 
naïve about what social scientists call the “contact hypothesis,” whereby face-to-face contact 
between different and diverse people fosters mutual recognition and facilitates mutual 
respect.42 On the ground, contact is much more complicated and much more controversial. 
Nonetheless, provoking and preserving conversations about Germany’s cultures could be a 
crucial contribution of religions such as Christianity in response to the rise of populism. For 
Christians, what is needed is a theology that retrieves Christianity’s identity in an open and 
open-ended way so that identity can become and be the theological hook for conversations 
across religious and non-religious contrasts. 
The publication Christians in the AfD invites, perhaps inadvertently, such a re-thinking 
of identity: “If you are able to name Christian standpoints in the AfD, please let us know” the 
anonymous authors write towards the end.43 Here, a conversation about Christianity is opened 
up. Who is to say that only Christians are allowed to contribute?   
                                                        
40 Ibid. 
41 Given the way populists pit Christianity against Islam (and Islam against Christianity), cross and crescent seem 
to be the most significant at the moment, but I see no reason not include the symbols of other faiths too. 
42 Müller, What Is Populism?, 114. 
43 Christliches in der AfD, 32. 
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